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No more than a messenger? 
 
 
If a real estate agent describes a property as being “a golden opportunity to 
invest” the expression will be readily construed as mere “puffery”.  The legal 
landscape changes when a real estate agent describes a property as “leased” 
and having a “guaranteed net income”.  Can an agent avoid potential liability, 
for an inaccurate description, by arguing that they were merely acting as a 
messenger to pass on information received from their vendor client? 
 
The potential liability of real estate agent “messengers” was recently 
considered by the Queensland Court of Appeal in Banks & Anor v Copas 
Newnham Pty Ltd & Ors [2002] QCA 217. 
 
Facts 
 
Mr and Mrs Banks obtained judgment in the District Court at Brisbane against 
the first and second defendants, being a corporate real estate agency and the 
individual who appeared to be the directing mind and will of the first defendant 
corporation, together with the third defendant, a firm of solicitors.  The 
successful claim was based on allegations of misleading conduct under s52 of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) in relation to the sale of a unit. 
 
The basis for the claim arose from the description of the unit, in a newspaper 
advertisement placed by the first two defendants, as “fully leased, and to be 
managed by an established national hotel operator- a guaranteed income 
under a five year lease with three further five year options”.  The 
advertisement also used the words “7% net guaranteed”.  Similar 
representations were contained in a letter, and an enclosed brochure, sent to 
Mr Banks by the second defendant. 
 
As it transpired there was no agreement for lease, or any guarantee of the 
rent payable.  At settlement there was nothing more than a registrable lease 
in favour a $2 company associated with the developer vendor.  After 
settlement of the unit the corporate tenant paid only a minimal amount of rent 
before defaulting and being placed in liquidation. 
 
On appeal, the first and second defendants challenged a number of the 
findings by the District Court. 
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Decision 
 
Contrary to the submission of the appellants, the Queensland Court of Appeal 
did not accept that qualities or characteristics such as “leased” or “guaranteed 
net income” could be regarded as mere puffery.  Although ultimately 
unsuccessful, a further submission made on appeal should be instructive to 
both real estate agents and their legal advisers. 
 
The first two defendants submitted that they were no more than a 
“messenger” acting to pass on information received from their developer 
client.  The basis of the submission was that the two defendants were simply 
expressing an opinion based upon the information received, without taking 
any responsibility for the accuracy of the information.  In making this 
submission reliance was placed in part on Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 
661. 
 
As mentioned, Justice McPherson (with the concurrence of McMurdo P and 
Mackenzie J) dismissed this submission.  McPherson JA referred to the 
passage in Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661 on which the submission was 
based, namely that “a corporation which purports to do no more than pass on 
information supplied by another” is not necessarily engaging in misleading or 
deceptive conduct if the information turns out to be false.  However, 
McPherson JA noted that this statement was predicated on, and immediately 
qualified by, what their Honours said in the following sentence: 
 
“If the circumstances are such to make it apparent that the corporation is not 
the source of the information and that it expressly or impliedly disclaims any 
belief in its truth or falsity, we very much doubt that the corporation can 
properly be said to be itself engaging in conduct that is misleading or 
deceptive.”1 
 
Unfortunately for the first two defendants, there was no suggestion in any of 
the advertising material or correspondence that the information being 
conveyed was someone else’s opinion or impression for which the defendants 
took no responsibility.  As noted by McPherson JA such a course of action 
was not adopted, as it would undoubtedly tend to deter or discourage 
potential investors.  In the circumstances the ordinary reader of the 
advertising material would be left with the distinct, but false, impression that 
the first two defendants had in their possession information that afforded 
reasonable grounds for belief in the representations they were making.  
Express disclaimers contained in the advertising material did not operate to 
relieve the defendants of their liability under the Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Cth). 
 
In the result the appeal was dismissed with costs. 
 
Conclusion 
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The decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal should come as a timely 
reminder that potential liability under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) for 
misleading or deceptive conduct is not easily avoided.  The facile retort that 
information is being conveyed as a messenger only is likely to fall on deaf 
judicial ears. 
 
If investment in property projects is solicited on the basis of information 
contained in advertising material, actively endorsed by a real estate agent, the 
agent must be aware that liability may attach notwithstanding that the agent 
may perceive their role as a messenger only. 
 
If any doubt is entertained concerning the accuracy of representations being 
made in advertising material it should be made clear that the information 
being conveyed is someone else’s opinion or impression for which the agent 
takes no responsibility.  Prudent practice dictates such an approach in all 
circumstances where an agent has no reasonable grounds for making a 
representation with respect to any future matter2.  As demonstrated by this 
decision, a general disclaimer of liability under the Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Cth) is unlikely to suffice. 
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2 S51A Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 
